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 The author’s argument is that Europe must renounce Kant’s universalism and 
adopt political means in resolving its permanently conflictual situations. In that 
way it is to construct its new identity that stems neither from the divergent past of 
its members nor from their divergent perceptions of the future, but is being built 
in the politically active present. The European Union as a community sui generis 
is founded on a paradox. Namely, it does not grow from its familiar historical 
identity, but is growing into it by permanently resolving the conflictual situations 
of the state of nature by political means. That paradoxical political project may be 
subscribed to only politically: mythologies, religions, ideologies and metaphysics 
would, as it were, create a state of nature but only at a higher cultural level. 
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The peoples of Europe, in creating an ever closer union among them, are resolved to 
share a peaceful future based on common values1. 
 
I. 
 The European Constitution is a document that does not only testify to the departure 
from the state as a contemporary rational construction of political community, but also 
from a theological legitimation of political rule through the will of people as a secular-
ised will of God. As Carl Schmitt would say, there is no need to waste words on that 
any more. The word God, or historically over laden word people, are no longer men-
tioned in the Constitution. Traditional theory of law has remained speechless. Old con-
cepts have become too narrow to describe current political processes, and the new so 
called post-modern ones are taken seriously only by a few due to their alleged chaotic 
nature. 
 Contemporary theorists of European constitutional law are facing a paradoxical 
question – how to build the EU as a legal-political community so that the existing plu-
ralism of national legal and political traditions2 and perpetual peace among them are 
preserved? Since this paradox cannot be resolved through a higher dialectical unity of 
opposites, because the relationships between national identities and the EU are inc-
ommensurable, some authors are simply sceptical toward EU as a political unity, 
whereas the others argue that European unity should be built through political relations 
of different entities, rather than on the Enlightenment thesis on the unity of humanity, 
nor through the quest for European people or the so called supranational cultural-his-
torical identity in a metaphysical stylisation. We support Rawls’ political argument in a 
broad sense.  
 Our argument reads: the existing pluralism of popular legal and political cultures 
does not obstruct European unity; it is jeopardised by the uncontrolled innovative plu-
ralism which stems from the permanent state of nature, no matter what metaphysical or 
historical a priori have been used to restrain it. European constitutional scholars do not 
know how to deal with the two different pluralisms: the one that has already been culti-
vated, and the one still uncultivated, which resists all loyalties and all cultures since it is 
legally unpredictable. Substantial stability of Europe can be built only through perma-
nent negotiations and discursive political practice as the method of a permanent depar-
ture from the state of nature. The existing divergent political cultures have been tradi-
tionally adapted to mutual cooperation.  
 So, the problem then is not that we use and will always use different discourses, but 
rather the fact that there is no discourse by which we could a priori control the condi-
 
1 Provisional version of the formulation of the draft of European Constitutional Treaty, Brussels, June 25, 
2004. 
2 The Greeks faced this paradox while deciding between polis and clans. Antigone is a victim of that 
paradox. The EU is facing a paradox: Polis was possible because decisions on the questions of oikos were not 
made there, but the decisions on general political issues. The contemporary EU allows decisions on economic 
issues, but resists from intervening into the national systems of political decision making. 
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tions we create through our innovative actions. We follow the rules of our special politi-
cal action unconsciously, in a manner of mythical action; namely in the permanent pre-
sent (we cannot act either yesterday or tomorrow). The effects of such a blind3 action 
are therefore uncertain, surprising and hence existentially dangerous. Uncertainty com-
pels us to cooperate with others so we would mutually try to master the existential un-
predictabilities and obscurities4. Such a direct political practice precedes European law 
by which it has been a posteriori codified. Law and politics are incommensurable forms 
of action. Law has a different temporal structure than politics; in relationship to politics 
it occurs a posteriori. The current European law has emerged from the relationship with 
European political practice and without it, it would have never been derived nor would 
have it been binding for anyone. Only because there is European political practice, 
Europe can exist in another political way, even with the existing democratic deficit, that 
is without democratic legitimation,. Democratic legitimation of law is not identical to 
politics, but it is rather a special form of the manifestation of politics.  
 Let us now consider the views of Armin von Bogdandy, the Eurorealist, and his 
discussion on fundamental principles of the European Constitution.  
 Fundamental or the so called pre-constitutional principles of the EU Constitution are 
liberty, the rule of law, democracy solidarity and loyalty. We ask ourselves whether a 
contemporary European adheres to these principles blindly, that is similarly to the 
mythical or ritual behaviour, or in Kant’s a priori manner, that is consciously; and if it 
is possible to permanently stabilise the EU on Kant’s a priori understanding of these 
principles of legal and political action? 
 Legal scholars, whether they knew it or not, think in Kant’s paradigm with a 
contemporary supplement that an open debate and permanent consensual process on 
these regulations are possible. Of course, none of the constitutional scholars believe that 
it is possible to establish such a level of the substantial stability of European political 
institutions as it exists in nation-states. What needs to be regulated with the Constitution 
is the existing normative chaos (constitutional chaos) as it was referred to by D. Curtin. 
Such a chaotic contradictory state generates distrust in the competences of European in-
stitutions, which only causes unforeseeable difficulties in political and legal actions. 
The debate on the principles of the European primary law is expected to establish order 
in this chaos and obscurity, and it will prove its efficiency through establishing a higher 
level of transparency in the relationships of power and competences between the EU 
and its members.  
 In this way the debate on the principles would provide its legal contribution to the 
creation of European constitutional identity and, prospectively, to the creation of Euro-
pean demos. At any rate, the European Constitution is born in the constitutional space of 
European national constitutions and so the national constitutions appear as constitutions 
in general normative context (Bogdandy, 2003: 157).  
 
3 Rawls uses the term the veil of ignorance. 
4 See: Habermas, 1985. Wittgenstein sees it differently: Does a cat know it is catching a mouse? It 
follows the rule unconsciously. The absolute cat should, according to Hegel, know why it is catching a mouse! 
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 As analysts and normativists, legal scholars know that the European Constitution is 
a constitution of detail. This peculiarity is, according to Bogdandy, an expression of 
distrust of the Member States toward those contents of the European Constitution, 
which would encroach upon sensitive issues of the source of actual power of political 
elites of the Member States. Naturally, the Union does not have a single source of 
power because it shares political power with the nation-states. The question is only how 
to arrange the relationship among the national and ruling elites of the European Union, 
namely, how to determine and control the sources of their political power: democrati-
cally, legally or in some other way? In nation-states the power is legitimized and con-
trolled democratically, in the EU predominantly legally. Thus, in the EU there are two 
levels of control and legitimation of power simultaneously at work: democratic and le-
gal. In addition, the heterogeneous national constitutions of 25 members cannot be pro-
jected in the Constitution of Europe as under some common denominator. The Euro-
pean Constitution must have a different legitimation and a different structure from indi-
vidual national constitutions and even from all of them together; it has to be something 
else, and not the constitution of a superstate nobody even wants.  
 The European Union is not a traditional political unity; it presupposes the exercise 
of power by various actors. Being aware of that, G. Frankenberg has reactivated the old 
contractual theories in order to explain the current state the EU has found itself in 
(Frankenberg, 2001: 39). He suggests contractual solving of political problems and 
contractual legitimation of the Union. Instead of a democratic source and legitimation of 
political power in nation-states, in the Union this role would be assumed by contracts, 
consensus, communication, loyalty and solidarity as different forms of the legitimation 
and control of supranational institutions of political power. These different legitimation 
processes are taking place simultaneously and therefore are not in any causal or theo-
logical relation. Democracy, on one hand, and contracts, consensus, communication and 
loyalty, on the other, are mutually incommensurable forms of action and legitimation. 
This principle incongruence of legitimation methods testifies that in modern Europe two 
different political orders exist simultaneously: the European and that of the Union’s 
Member States.  
 What pre-constitutional political motives make this parallelism possible? We pre-
liminary claim − the state of nature which exists simultaneously in both systems: in the 
system of the Union and in the Member States. The state of nature requires and simulta-
neously makes possible two-fold institutionalisation of the European demos: the internal 
one and the suprastate, the European one. We wonder if this incommensurable parallel-
ism should be bridged by traditional federative means, modelled on the constitution of 
the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation, or by gradual creation of an overlapping 
constitution the national constitutions gradually flow into, thus becoming amalgamated 
in or with it. Habermas has contemplated this alternative at a deeper level when in Fak-
tizität und Geltung he did not have in mind only a communicative amalgamation of na-
tional constitutions and the European Constitution, but the symbiosis of the state of na-
ture and political order. 
 If we bear in mind the existence of various political communities parallel to the 
European one, then the discussion on pre-constitutional principles of the European Con-
stitution represents the search for the minimal nonbinding principled symbiosis or 
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amalgamation of these incommensurable political realities. This process represents the 
search for a substitute for Hegel’s dialectical overcoming of these incommensurable op-
posites at the higher speculative unity.  
 
II. 
 It is apparent that the four mentioned pre-constitutional principles correspond to fun-
damental requirements of Kant’s social contract. The impression is intensified when 
Bogdandy, using Kantian vocabulary, lists the open questions of supranational federa-
tion sui generis, and these are, according to him, the relationships between unity and 
plurality, centre and periphery, the whole and its parts, organism and its limbs, higher 
and lower levels, connections and the connected. All these relationships can be, without 
further ado, rationally resolved within Kant’s transcendental project, which does not dif-
ferentiate theory from practice (Kant, 2000). By observing the dysfunction of these con-
cepts, which is based on the analysis of the material, Bogdandy demonstrates in a 
counter factual way that the unity of theory and practice on which Kant builds his con-
ception of perpetual peace does not work. From the position of his or her own selective 
blindness, a pragmatist does not notice the question why it does not work. However, a 
conscientious pragmatist in his or her analyses of the material nonetheless reveals cases, 
which do not fit into the method of his or her analysis.  
 Due to a dual legitimation base, the European Constitution, modelled on the unity of 
differences, should integrate, dialectically or at least pragmatically, in it national con-
stitutions and thus lead the systemic, or dialectical and democratic or practical principle 
up to the process of their gradual integration. Of course, this dialectical figure has been 
renounced by the argument that Europe is not a process of approaching a beforehand-
defined goal and telos, namely, a complete political integration in which the existing 
differences among divergent members are being lost. 
  Instead of a complete integration, now structural compatibility between the EU and 
heterogeneous nation-states whose heterogeneity only increases with new members, is 
on the table. Achieving structural compatibility in the current situation is the task (Bog-
dandy, 2003: 189), which requires a maximal political engagement, loyalty and solidar-
ity of all the Union’s members. Given the voluntary character of the Union’s member-
ship, scholars realise that even a creeping constitutional homogenisation might be inter-
rupted at any moment by an autonomous step of any member. Instead of homogenisa-
tion and integration, the term used everywhere is structural compatibility, which is cer-
tainly an expression of legal appreciation of the relationship between the incommensur-
able concepts. Incommensurable constitutional and traditional projects can be alleviated 
only practically, in the same way as the lack of mutual understanding between members 
of two different languages can be bridged by pantomime. With factual plurality of na-
tional constitutions, the EU, as a legal and political community, can be developed only 
through political practice, and not through a priori constitutional models, not even when 
they have been democratically harmonised. In conflictual situations a constitutional 
identity of the divergent members that can always withdraw from the agreement they 
had previously accepted can be preserved only in this way. 
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 Aside from the incongruence between the national constitutions and the European 
Constitution and other European treaties, Bogdandy asserts that the intrusion of Euro-
pean supranational legislation into national legislations is so enormous, that it gives rise 
to centripetal forces, which aim to develop numerous mechanisms for the protection of 
national identities (193). 
 
III. 
 The problems of protecting national political identities emerged when unified Union 
regulations started to be operative, or started to be concretised in the nation-states. Is it, 
however, possible to overcome the disharmony between national legislations with the 
EU legislations by legal disourse, or should these processes of mutual adjustment be-
tween two or more legal traditions be left to the practice of political action? 
 Protecting the differences, which are safeguarded by the Council of Europe, no mat-
ter if this is done by democratic or communicative political means, is the condition for 
the members’ equality and with that a presupposition of the universally acceptable le-
gitimation of the supranational rule. If the Union is not to be the means of hegemonic 
aspirations of any state, or of European bureaucracy and technocracy, then the institu-
tional means against such tendencies must exist.  
 In addition to all that, the substantial stability of the EU, in our opinion, cannot be 
expected because the heterogeneity of the community is not derived only from the plu-
ral tradition of the members but also from the innovative political action of all the indi-
viduals and all the members. In that sense the Union is an open political process, rather 
than a constitutionally closed system, and that is the real reason why Kant’s principles 
of legal apriorism are non-functional and obsolete.  
 It turned out that the four Kant’s pre-constitutional principles of integration are not 
operational since the members politically resist such an a priori integration. Pluralism is 
no pathology in terms of departing from the ultimate rationality, as Kant and the 
Enlightenment thinkers thought, but rather an inevitable condicio humana. 
 Why does Kant’s thesis of universal integration of all people in Europe and on the 
globe not work? The reasons are not beyond our understanding. The state of nature can-
not be abolished either constitutionally or in some other way, nor are there any guaran-
tees that we will keep encountering it under constant a priori conditions as Kant antici-
pated. It is so because practical action of idiosyncratic subjects is taking place in real 
time in the present, here and now, so it is also permanently open to the state of nature 
which cannot be annihilated with any contract, not even with a brute force. The legal 
theory and pre-constitutional principles of Kant are connected to the spatial-temporal a 
priori, therefore they are valid in the perfect and in the future. In that way they are in-
congruent with practical action in the present, which permanently borders on the state of 
nature. In his book Faktizität und Geltung, Habermas tried to resolve the incom-
mensurability of action and Kant’s spatial-temporal apriorism with a discursive a priori, 
but in doing that he overlooked that the structure of grammatical differentiation of the 
past and the future, which is incommensurable with political action in the present, is 
also imposed upon practical action by the discursive a priori.  
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 In our action, naturally, we follow our discursive projections on the past and the fu-
ture; however, such an action conditioned by discourse, enables the orientation only in 
familiar or stylised situations. We cannot rely on such an orientation in the state of na-
ture that we permanently touch upon in our action. Each discursive projection of action 
when applied disappoints the actors, because the discursive a priori cannot be practi-
cally realised, since theory is not identical to practice, nor can theory be imitated with-
out a remainder by practice. If this were possible, the theory would commit violence 
against free practice. 
 The mentioned four Kant’s pre-constitutional principles, with which we are to depart 
from the state of nature, are supported by conservative authors, although they know that 
they are unfeasible. Contrary to them, we should start from the argument that the state 
of nature is permanent so it can be resolved only practically, and not by a doctrine. The 
EU is not defined as a stabile legal order among European states, but as a political 
method of a permanent departure from the state of nature by means of practical, and not 
imaginary, doctrinaire or metaphysical contracts. So, the point in question is not how to 
constitutionally and legally overcome the existing pluralism and traditional differences 
among the Union’s members, but rather how to practically preserve the differences from 
threatening uncertainties of the state of nature, as well as from doctrinaire levelling, 
homogenisations and integrations, since these are the dangers which constantly influ-
ence European politics.  
 It is this paradoxical status of the community sui generis that we have to play our-
selves in. It should by no means be forgotten that existing differences among traditions 
also emerged through the innovative action of the members, through which different 
national entities have been historically shaped. Overcoming these long-known historical 
differences among European states is unproductive. What has already happened, can 
neither be recalled, nor declared non-existent. Those differences among the Union’s 
members, which permanently arise in connection with the state of nature, here and now, 
must be resolved politically.  
 Europe must free itself from Kant’s universalism, the Enlightenment cosmopolitism 
and ontological apriorism, on the basis of which it is already known, in advance, with 
astronomic precision, when and how something will happen. It has to preserve its ca-
pacity to resolve those conflictual situations, which it permanently produces here and 
now, by political means. In that way it constructs its new identity that stems neither 
from the divergent past of its members nor from their divergent perceptions of the fu-
ture, but is being built in the politically active present. The European Union as a com-
munity sui generis is founded on a paradox: It does not grow from its familiar historical 
identity, but is growing into it by permanently resolving the conflictual situations of the 
state of nature by political means. That paradoxical political project may be subscribed 
to only politically: mythologies, religions, ideologies and metaphysics would, as it were, 
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